

















































Based	 on	 stakeholder	 interviews,	 this	 study	 analyses	 the	 opinions	 related	 to	 the	 recently	 implemented	
individual	transferable	quota	(ITQ)	system	for	the	Finnish	herring	and	sprat	fisheries.	Similarly,	opinions	were	
collected	 in	 2007	 by	 Kulmala	 et	 al.	 related	 to	 a	 possible	 implementation	 of	 ITQs,	 thus	 creating	 a	 unique	




































en	 stor	 grad	 handlar	 om	 att	 reglera	 människans	 beteende,	 därmed	 är	 social	 acceptans	 en	 nödvändig	
förutsättning	för	en	framgångsrik	fiskeriförvaltning.	Genom	intervjuer	med	intressenter,	analyserar	denna	
studie	 åsikter	 kring	 de	 individuella	 överförbara	 fiskerättigheterna	 som	 nyligen	 implementerades	 för	 det	
kommersiella	 strömmings-	 och	 vassbuksfisket	 i	 Finland.	Kulmala	 et	 al.	 samlade	år	 2007	 in	åsikter	 om	en	















































room	 for	 improvement	 (Beddington	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 Fishery	 fleet	 overcapitalization	 is	
considered	one	of	the	key	factors	behind	“the	tragedy	of	the	commons”	(Hardin,	1968)	
and	the	resulting	overfishing	(FAO,	2016).	There	have	been	several	suggestions	how	to	
overcome	 this	 problem,	 and	 among	 them,	 rights-based	 management	 (RBM)	 is	 one	
popular	 approach	 (Cunningham,	 2005).	 There	 are	 two	 important	 movements	 that	
recently	 have	 taken	 place	 in	 the	 field	 of	 fisheries	 management	 (Beddington	 et	 al.,	
2007).	 The	 first	 one	 is	 the	 shift	 to	 ecosystem-based	 fisheries	management	 (EBFM),	
which	provides	a	holistic	approach	to	the	structure	and	interactions	between	fisheries	
and	 the	 ecosystem.	 The	 second	 important	 movement	 is	 the	 usage	 of	 economic	
incentives	to	motivate	fishers	to	endure	short-term	sacrifices	in	pursuit	of	long-term	
benefits	 (Grafton	 et	 al.,	 2006).	 One	 of	 the	most	 prominent	 RBM	 approaches	 is	 the	
Individual	Transferable	Quota	(ITQ)	system,	which	utilizes	economic	incentives	in	an	
effort	to	achieve	sustainable	fisheries.	Since	its	first	application	in	New	Zealand,	ITQs	









of	 any	 management	 measure	 (Gutiérrez	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 Following	 the	 general	
recommendations	 of	 the	 European	 Common	 Fishery	 Policy	 (CFP)	 and	 to	 battle	 the	
declining	economic	efficiency	(Guillen	et	al.,	2018),	Finland	introduced	an	ITQ	system	
in	 2017	 to	manage	 the	 national	 commercial	 herring,	 sprat	 and	 salmon	 fisheries.	 It	
needs	to	be	acknowledged	that	the	quota	system	in	Finland	goes	under	the	term	TFC	
(transferable	fishing	concessions),	as	proposed	by	the	European	Commission,	referring	








prior	 study	 has	 utilized	 stakeholder	 information,	 obtained	 through	 personal	
interviews,	 to	 compile	 stakeholder	 opinions	 from	 both	 a	 pre-	 and	 post	 ITQ	
management	implementation	scenario.		
Finnish	 fisheries	 have	 long	 battled	 with	 declining	 revenues	 and	 the	 number	 of	
commercial	fishers	has	steadily	declined,	lately	as	a	consequence	of	the	high	average	
age	of	fishers	(Guillen	et	al.,	2018).	Finnish	fisheries	can	roughly	be	divided	into	two	





national	 landings,	 measured	 both	 in	 value	 and	 gross	 tonnage	 (Natural	 Resource	




stakeholders,	 and	 by	 doing	 so,	 generate	 an	 educated	 base	 for	 future	developments.	
Through	the	information	obtained	from	the	interviews	the	Finnish	ITQ	system	will	be	
evaluated	 based	 on	 the	 same	 three	 target	 areas	 mentioned	 by	 both	 the	 Finnish	





of	 the	 system.	 A	 brief	 overview	of	 the	 upraise	 of	 Finnish	 commercial	 fisheries	will	





In	 the	 effort	 of	 controlling	 the	 utilization	 of	 a	 common	 resource,	 economists	 have	
suggested	 the	 usage	 of	 Rights-Based	 Management	 (RBM)	methods,	 with	 a	 general	




al.,	 2014).	 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 quota	 systems	 categorizes	 under	 the	 term	 RBM:	
Individual	 Quotas	 (IQ)	 and	 Individual	 Transferable	 Quotas	 (ITQ)	 allocated	 to	
individuals,	 Individual	 Vessel	 Quotas	 (IVQ)	 allocated	 to	 fishing	 vessels,	 Enterprise	
























individual	 incentives	with	 the	profit	maximisation	aims	of	 the	 fleet.	Ultimately,	 this	
allows	the	whole	fleet	to	make	rational	economic	decisions	that	optimise	the	individual	






added	 to	 reach	 the	EBFM	requirements.	However,	 in	doing	 so	 the	overall	 incentive	
structure	 might	 be	 weakened,	 since	 fishers	 confident	 in	 future	 long-term	 benefits	
might	be	decreased	along	with	more	regulative	inputs	(Emery	et	al.,	2012).	
In	addition	to	the	ITQ	system	being	criticised	 for	being	too	 inflexible	 to	meet	EBFM	
goals,	ITQs	have	also	been	criticised	for	some	of	its	socio-cultural	impacts	(Copes,	1996;	
Copes	and	Charles,	2004;	Young	et	al.,	2018).	The	option	to	sell	quotas	through	market	






e.g.	 reductions	 in	 employment,	 which	 effects	 stretches	 from	 an	 individual	 level	 to	












aspects,	 and	 is	 in	 its	 nature	 a	 highly	 interdisciplinary	 field.	 According	 to	 a	 study	
comparing	 130	 fisheries	 worldwide	 (Gutiérrez	 et	 al.,	 2011),	 the	 most	 important	
attributes	for	a	successful	fisheries	co-management	system	(i.e.	cooperation	between	
managers,	 fishers	 and	 scientists)	 are	 strong	 leadership,	 high	 social	 capital	 and	 an	
individual	quota	system.		
Separating	market	mechanisms	from	social	objectives	might	be	a	difficult	task,	as	social	
and	economic	objectives	often	are	 closely	entangled.	Høst	 suggests	 in	his	book	The	
Economics	of	Market-Based	Fisheries	Management	(Høst,	2015),	that	fisheries	are	in	fact	
a	combination	of	different	peoples	with	different	values,	thus	forming	different	groups	
and	 communities	 in	 the	 society.	 Further	 adding,	 that	 safeguards	 are	 therefore	
developed	 to	 protect	 the	 interests	 of	 these	 different	 groups,	 which	 ultimately	 are	
properties	 that	 form	 the	 industry.	 Applying	 this	 thought	 into	 the	 context	 of	 rights-
based	 fisheries	 management	 systems,	 ITQs	 provide	 the	 market	 mechanism	 for	
reaching	a	higher	economic	efficency,	while	national	or	regional	safeguards	protect	the	
social	 interests	 of	 various	 groups	 within	 the	 society,	 e.g.	 safeguards	 for	 protecting	
small-scale	fisheries.		
The	Catch	Share	Design	Manual	(Bonzon	et	al.,	2013)	lists	common	social	and	economic	





• Declining	revenues	 • Exceedingly	complictated	
regulations	
• “Race	for	fish”	 • Desire	for	increased	stability	and	
predictability	
• Overcapatilized	fleet	 • Significant	safety	concerns	
• Excess	gear	deployment	 • Conflicts	between	different	fishing	
sectors	















Fish	 as	 a	 commodity,	 has	 historically	 been	 an	 important	 source	 of	 income	 for	 the	
coastal	population	in	Finland.	The	Finnish	coast	consists	of	a	widespread	archipelago,	






central	 role	 in	 the	 development	 of	 Finnish	 fisheries	 (Salmi	 and	 Salmi,	 2010),	 e.g.	
creating	conflicts	between	water	owners,	commercial	fishers	and	recreational	fishers	
targeting	the	same	fish	and	sometimes	even	using	the	same	methods	(Salmi,	2009a).		
Contrary	 to	 Sweden	 and	 Norway,	 where	 fisheries	 managed	 to	 form	 organisations	
securing	 political	 and	 economic	 support,	 Finnish	 fisheries	 lacked	 sufficient	 political	
support	after	the	Second	World	War	(Eklund,	1993).	It	was	only	in	the	late	1960s	and	









Adapting	 the	 EUs	 CFP	 and	 forming	 international	 agreements	 also	 transferred	 the	
decision	 making	 framework	 from	 regional	 communities	 to	 outside	 bodies	 (Salmi,	
2012).	The	Finnish	herring	and	sprat	TAC	limits	are	decided	on	an	EU	level.	Prior	to	the	
individual	quota	allocation,	the	TAC	was	open	for	all	registered	commercial	fishers	to	














which	 lately	a	 large	portion	have	been	transferred	to	 foreign	owners,	e.g.	Estonians	







affect	 fishers’	 perceptions	 of	 the	 ITQ	 system,	 although	 the	 event	 was	 purely	
coincidental.	
The	 number	 of	workers	within	 Finnish	 fisheries	 have	 steadily	 decreased	 since	 the	
beginning	of	the	20th	century.	It	is	estimated	that	in	1901	the	number	of	commercial	
fishers	was	 at	 least	 20,000	 (Salmi,	 2009b),	whereas	 in	 2017	 the	 commercial	 fisher	












































to	 sky	 rocket”	 (quote	 from	 personal	 discussions).	 The	 herring	 fishing	 rights	 were	
divided	between	the	two	different	fishing	methods,	in	an	effort	to	protect	the	small-
scale	coastal	fisheries.	It	is	not	possible	to	fully	transfer	the	right	for	trap-net	fishing	to	
a	 trawl	 fishing	 company.	 However,	 the	 annual	 quota	 can	 be	 transferred	 e.g.	 if	 the	















The	 interview	 participants	 covered	 six	 different	 stakeholder	 groups	 (see	 table	 2);	
management,	 researcher,	 unions,	 interest	 groups	 (including	 fish	 processors	 and	
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sustainable	fisheries	promotors),	commercial	trawl	and	trap-net	fishers.	These	groups	

















interviews	were	designed	 to	 cover	 certain	areas	using	open-ended	questions	which	
encouraged	 further	 discussions	 and	 contemplations.	 The	 interviews	 were	 audio	
recorded	and	transcribed	using	the	software	Express	Scribe.		
The	 interview	 transcripts	 were	 entered	 into	 Atlas.ti	 and	 coded	 using	 a	 thematic	
analysis	approach.	This	process	enables	systematic	categorization	and	identification	of	








mechanism	=	outcome,	where	mechanisms	are	 the	 features	of	 a	 system	and	context	
describes	the	conditions	wherein	the	mechanisms	operate	(Pawson	and	Tilley,	1997).	
According	 to	 the	 aims	 of	 the	 Finnish	 ITQ	 system,	 as	 stated	 by	 the	 managers,	 the	





As	 the	new	 fisheries	management	 system	 in	Finland	has	only	been	applied	 for	 two	
years,	 data	 on	 changes	 in	 economic	 or	 environmental	 performances	 are	 limited,	
showcasing	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 interviews	 conducted	 in	 this	
research.	To	determine	whether	perceptions	regarding	the	ITQ	system	have	changed	







different	 aspects	 of	 the	 ITQ	 system,	 the	 management	 and	 future	 prospects.	 For	
comparative	 reasons	 the	 interview	 questions	 are	 here	 divided	 into	 the	 same	 six	
categories	 utilized	 in	 Kulmala	 et	 al.	 (2007)	 study:	 (1)	 Opinions	 regarding	 the	
management,	(2)	Initial	allocation,	(3)	Attributes	of	quotas,	(4)	Pros	and	cons	of	the	













All	 stakeholders	were	 of	 the	 opinion	 that	 herring	 and	 sprat	 fish	 stocks	 need	 to	 be	
managed,	and	the	majority	saw	that	it	is	best	to	have	separate	quotas	for	herring	and	
sprat.	A	couple	saw	some	benefits	in	combining	them,	especially	in	the	main	basin	area,	
where	 sprat	 is	 often	 considered	 as	 a	 limiting	 factor	 when	 catching	 herring.	 One	

























same	 amount	 as	 a	 few	 years	 back.	 However,	 simultaneously	 mentioning	 that	 the	
national	 TAC	 reduced	 by	 some	40%	a	 couple	of	 years	 back,	 naturally	 reducing	 the	
amount	of	catch	the	quota	covers.	The	general	perception	among	trap-net	fishers	was	





















working	 properly.	 Secondly,	 the	 reduced	 race-to-fish	 was	 appreciated	 among	 all	





money”	 after	 selling	 their	 quota	 rights.	 Damages	 caused	 by	 the	 seals	 and	 black	
cormorants	were	considered	far	bigger	issues	for	the	trap-net	fishers.	Regarding	the	
law	stating	that	one	actor	can	possess	a	maximum	of	20%	of	the	national	quotas,	the	


















to	 foreign	 owners,	 however	 this	 development	 was	 already	 visible	 before	 the	
introduction	 of	 the	 quota	 system.	 Risk	 associated	 with	 buying	 more	 quotas	 was	
considered	low,	although	drastic	changes	in	the	TAC	limit	was	acknowledged	to	impact	
the	stability.	A	slight	risk	was	noted	among	trap-net	 fishing,	given	that	 the	seal	and	


























it	 was	 noted	 that	 environmental	 and	 other	 practical	 issues	 hinder	 this,	 especially	
during	 the	warm	 summer	 months.	 Some	 however	 saw	 a	 possibility	 that	 increased	
demand	 and	 fish	 prices	would	 allow	 for	 fishing	 of	 herring	 for	 human	 consumption	
during	the	summer	months.		
None	 of	 the	 interviewees	 considered	 the	 quota	 system	 to	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	
sustainability	of	the	fish	stocks,	since	the	Finnish	TAC	is	still	decided	on	the	basis	of	the	









Quota	saving,	or	bankable	 ITQs,	were	suggested	as	a	method	 to	 fully	or	partly	save	
quotas	for	the	following	year	in	return	for	an	interest	rate	based	on	fish	growth	and	
reproduction	 potential.	 Of	 the	 fifteen	 participants,	 nine	 were	 of	 the	 opinion	 that	 a	
possibility	 for	 “quota	 saving”	 would	 be	 a	 welcomed	 addition.	 However,	 none	







The	general	perception	was	 that	 the	number	of	 fishers	will	 continue	 to	 reduce	as	a	
consequence	of	 the	high	average	age	among	 fishers,	 lack	of	political	will	 to	 support	
fisheries	 and	 as	 a	 natural	 development	 from	modernising	 the	 fleet	 and	 processors	
facilities,	 and	 that	 the	 quota	 system	 did	 not	 have	 any	 major	 impact	 on	 this	
development.	 It	 is	estimated	that	 the	trawling	sector	will	continue	 its	concentration	









Eleven	 out	 of	 the	 fifteen	 participants	 considered	 the	 possibilities	 for	 newcomers	 to	
enter	the	fishing	industry	as	weak,	despite	the	managers	efforts	of	keeping	a	door	open	
for	 new	 fishers.	 The	 quotas	 were	 now	 seen	 as	 a	 further	 investment	 needed	 when	
entering	the	industry,	on	top	of	all	other	costs.	Several	stakeholders	were	also	of	the	
opinion	 that	 it	 is	 not	 a	 profitable	 business	 to	 enter.	 The	 Finnish	 system	was	 also	
criticised	by	a	 couple	 stakeholders,	 saying	 that	by	 saving	4%	of	 the	Finnish	TAC	 to	
newcomers,	the	managers	just	further	reduced	the	current	fishers	part	of	the	catch.	A	




stakeholder	had	a	positive	view	of	 the	 future	of	 the	Finnish	 fishery	 fleet,	saying	the	
	 22	
quota	 system	enhances	profitability	and	possibilities,	 all	while	a	positive	 sign	of	 an	
upswing	 in	demand	can	be	seen.	Concerns	 for	the	trap-net	community	were	visible,	
however	 for	reasons	other	than	the	quota	system.	Nonetheless,	some	optimism	was	




the	 interviews,	 an	 important	 explanatory	 factor	 is	 the	 context	 which	 within	 the	













Finnish context,  
















































































































An	 interesting	 aspect	 of	 the	 Finnish	 context	 is	 the	 privately-owned	 water	 areas,	
affecting	mainly	the	coastal	fishers.	With	the	introduction	of	individual	quotas,	the	state	
now	regulates	fishers	catch	on	their	own	land,	whereas	before,	fishers	could	freely	fish	
as	 long	 as	 the	 TAC	 was	 not	 exceeded.	 This	 creates	 a	 peculiar	 situation	 and	 it	 will	









economic	 performance.	 The	 bioeconomic	 modelling	 conducted	 by	 Kulmala	 et	 al.	
(2007)	estimated	an	increase	in	profits	after	the	implementation	of	ITQs	due	to	a	more	
efficient	fleet	structure	and	a	policy	that	considers	the	properties	of	the	Finnish	Herring	
fishery.	 Moreover,	 the	 majority	 of	 fishers	 at	 that	 time	 believed	 in	 both	 increased	
profitability	and	decreased	competition	if	a	quota-based	management	system	would	
be	implemented.	Similarly,	the	general	belief	among	the	stakeholders	in	this	study	was	












mechanism	 to	 decrease	 capital	 tied	 to	 the	 fishery.	 The	 opinions	 regarding	
transferability	 were	 more	 positive	 among	 stakeholders	 after	 than	 prior	 to	 the	
implementation	of	ITQs.	In	this	study,	the	two	stakeholders	opposing	transferability	
were	mainly	against	 the	quotas	going	to	 foreign	owners,	otherwise	 it	was	seen	as	a	




30	 vessels,	 approx.	 one-third	 of	 the	 fleet,	 would	 quit	 herring	 harvesting	 after	 the	
implementation	of	ITQs.	As	of	this	date,	no	such	data	is	available	and	thus	will	be	an	
interesting	 question	 for	 future	 studies	 and	 monitoring.	 However,	 all	 interview	
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study,	 none	 of	 the	 four	 food	 fishers	 experienced	 their	 share	 of	 the	 total	 catch	 to	
increase,	on	the	contrary	they	were	quite	unhappy	of	their	proportion	of	the	quotas.	
Noteworthy	 is	 that	 several	 stakeholders	mentioned	 the	 lack	 of	 herring	 suitable	 for	





Gutiérrez	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 identified	 three	 attributes	 important	 for	 successful	 fisheries	
management:	 strong	 leadership,	high	social	 capital	 and	an	 individual	quota	 system.	
Fisheries	management	 is	 to	 a	 large	 degree	 about	managing	 human	behaviour,	 thus	
acceptance	of	a	management	system	is	crucial	for	its	success.	In	Kulmala	et	al.	(2007)	
study,	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 fishers	 interviewed	 supported	 individual	 quotas	 as	 a	




social	 capital.	 Based	 on	 the	 comments	 from	 the	 interviewees,	 the	 Ministry	 of	
















the	systems	continuation.	This	 is	an	 important	 issue	directly	affecting	the	perceived	
stability	level	of	the	system,	and	as	such,	adequate	attention	should	be	put	on	this	topic	
for	the	upcoming	review	of	the	management	system.	
A	 couple	 stakeholders	 presented	 concerns	 regarding	 the	 managers	 adding	 various	










process	was	 the	 fishers	 targeting	 food	 herring,	 with	 the	 trawler	 saying	 allocations	
should	have	prioritised	food	fishers	and	trap-net	fishers	stating	they	should	have	been	
left	 outside	 the	 system.	 Interestingly,	 the	managers	 stated	 that	 the	 trap-net	 fishers	
were	included	in	the	ITQ	system	according	to	their	own	wishes.		
Similarly	to	the	study	in	2007,	stakeholders	today	found	it	difficult,	expensive	and	in	
some	 cases	 unprofitable	 for	 newcomers	 to	 enter	 the	 fishery	 industry.	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	concerns	expressed	in	2007	regarding	the	future,	e.g.	low	profitability	and	heavy	








fishers	expressed	 their	worry	 towards	 the	accumulation	of	 environmental	 toxins	 in	
herring.	The	situation	in	2018	was	considered	vastly	improved,	the	dioxin	levels	have	
significantly	 reduced,	 and	 stakeholders	 believed	 that	 trend	would	 continue.	On	 the	
other	 hand,	 the	 increased	 seal	 and	 black	 cormorant	 populations	 were	 seen	 as	
significant	threats	for	the	trap-net	fishers,	however	not	affecting	trawlers.	
Unlike	many	 fisheries	 implementing	 quota-based	management,	 the	 Finnish	 herring	
and	 sprat	 fisheries	 were	 not	 struggling	 with	 overfishing.	 ITQ	 enables	 enhanced	
economic	 performance	 simultaneously	 as	 it	 keeps	 fish	 stocks	 at	 a	 sustainable	 level	
given	the	correct	estimation	of	the	TAC.	With	these	two	factors	in	mind,	no	stakeholder	
considered	ITQs	to	have	an	impact	on	the	size	of	herring	and	sprat	fish	stocks,	since	
TAC	 is	 based	 on	 the	 same	 scientific	 evidence	 as	 previously.	 The	 concept	 of	 “quota	
saving”	was	treated	the	same	way	in	this	study	as	well	as	in	Kulmala	et	al.	(2007)	study,	



























and	 stability.	 Future	 studies	 will	 determine	 whether	 this	 is	 true	 or	 not.	 Another	
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Q16:	How	do	you	believe	the	 future	of	 the	Finnish	 fishery	 fleet	 looks	 like,	 in	 the	
light	of	the	new	management	system?	
Q17:	“Quota	saving”,	is	it	something	that	would	interest	you?	
	
